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In this paper we have examined the issue of convergence of per capita GDP across 7 
South Asian countries during 1960-2000 using World Bank data. Empirical results 
failed to find evidence of σ convergence, β convergence and conditional β (βc) 
convergence in South Asia. The reasons for non-convergence of per capita GDP can 
be explained by low and falling volume of intra-country trade, weak governance and 
low level of growth achieved by the individual countries. Further, non-convergence 
can be attributed to explanations provided by endogenous growth models.  
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Convergence of Per Capita GDP across SAARC Countries 
 
I Introduction 
The concept of convergence is well known in the literature implying "forces 
accelerating the growth of nations who were latecomers to industrialization and 
economic development give rise to a tendency towards convergence of levels of per 
capita product or, alternatively of per worker product" Baumol (1986:1075). David 
Hume contended that transfer of technology to be a driving force for convergence of 
poorer and richer countries by enlarging the size of their markets.  
Conceptually, two broad concepts of convergence can be discerned, namely β 
convergence and σ convergence1. The former relates to convergence of per capita 
income through the “catching up process” while the latter signifies the convergence of 
cross-sectional dispersion of per capita income (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
Convergence (σ) occurs if the dispersion (inequality) of per capita declines over time.  
It is contended that β convergence tends to generate σ convergence. Hence, 
economists place inordinate emphasis on the study of growth process only to find 
“this process is offset by new disturbances that tend to increase dispersion.” (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995:383). Thus, it may be weakly stated that β convergence may 
be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for σ convergence2. After all, economic 
growth and income inequality are generated by complex and myriad factors of which 
income is only one of them. 
Economic theory suggests reasons why poor countries may “catch up” with 
rich countries over time in terms of per capita income. In particular, the Solow-Swan 
neoclassical growth model predicts that capital will flow from rich to poorer 
                                                        
1 A third concept of convergence namely conditional β convergence is often talked about which takes 
into account the non-identical nature of steady-state growth path for per capita output for various 
countries. 
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countries, thereby promoting faster economic growth in the latter. The key underlying 
assumption is that there are diminishing returns to capital. This means that the returns 
to capital are higher in poor countries, which are relatively poorly endowed with 
capital, than in well endowed capital rich economies. There is a growing empirical 
literature on convergence and comprehensive overviews can be found in Rassekh 
(1998), De la Fuente (1997) and Quah (1996). 
For large samples of countries that cut across regions and income levels, most 
of the evidence fails to support absolute convergence. Although large samples of 
countries do not display convergence, the evidence of convergence is somewhat 
stronger for smaller groups of countries specially among countries at similar income 
levels. Ben David (1998) and Chatterji (1992) find empirical evidence of convergence 
among the world’s richest and poor countries although they fail to do so for middle-
income countries. Galor (1996) and Quah (1997) provide theoretical justifications for 
the convergence club hypothesis, according to which convergence will occur among 
subsets as opposed to broad samples of countries.  
The central objective of this study is to empirically examine whether or not 
convergence is occurring over time in South Asia. The countries of South Asia have 
formed a regional block known as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). SAARC comprises of seven countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, India, 
Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  Section II outlines the salient features of the 
sampled countries. Section III deals with the empirical investigation of the issue of 
convergence in the sampled countries. Section IV contains a discussion of the results 
and Section V summarises the major findings of the study. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995:31) neatly demonstrate that, “… even if absolute convergence holds in 
our sense, the dispersion of per capita income does not necessarily tend to decline over time.” 
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II   SAARC: Achieving Unity Among Diversity  
The South Asian region comprising the SAARC countries is unique.  SAARC 
countries differ enormously in size, population and economic development.  They 
also share divergent social, economic and political arrangement.  These divergences 
offer enormous difficulties as well as challenges in the formation of SAARC. 
Size 
 Of the seven SAARC countries, all the countries barring India and Pakistan 
are small in territorial size.  Two countries (Bhutan, Nepal) are land-locked and their 
contact with the rest of the world virtually depends on the cooperation of India, while 
Maldives and Sri Lanka are island states.  India, by its sheer size, occupies over 70 
per cent of the landmass of the region and its territorial and maritime boundary hugs 
all the SAARC countries.  On the other hand, none of the six members have a 
common boundary with each other.  In terms of population figures, India has nearly 
90 per cent of the region's population. 
 India's dominance is not restricted to size only.  India's GDP accounts for 
nearly 77 per cent of the region's GDP in 2000 (World Tables, 2002).  In terms of 
manufacturing value added, India contributes nearly 80 per cent of the region's 
manufacturing value added and also dominates the export and import volume of the 
region.  Because of her large land area, India is also well endowed with natural 
resources and minerals and some of these (eg., uranium, iron ore, gold and silver etc.) 
are exclusive to India alone. 
 
Political, Social and Economic Structure 
 All the SAARC countries have a turbulent political history.  These countries 
were colonies of the imperial power at a certain stage in their political history.  Apart 
from India, all the SAARC countries lack, to varying degrees, a democratic tradition.  
The armed forces of some of the SAARC countries have an over-bearing influence on 
policy making in this region.  Some of the countries (India and Pakistan) are involved 
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in open hostilities and have fought three wars over land rights.  Various bilateral 
issues cause temporary tensions among the SAARC countries, e.g., Ganges water 
dispute between Bangladesh and India, cancellation of land route permits between 
India and Nepal, Kashmir and Khalistan issues between India and Pakistan, the Tamil 
Elam problem between India and Sri Lanka. 
 However, there are some common elements between the countries of the 
region.  Poverty and under-development is pervasive throughout.  They are all heavily 
dependent on external assistance and foreign aid.  The societal organisation is based 
on feudal traditions giving rise to a hierarchical class structure.  All of these countries 
have ethnic problems because the countries are, to varying degrees, ethnically 
heterogenous.  The problem is further compounded by the fact that co-ethnic groups 
exist in the neighbouring states.  Although often reflecting ethnic divisions, many of 
the conflicts within states also have a political or economic character.  Hence, this 
factor alone causes significant tension among countries, even arising from isolated 
incidents. An example of such an incident might be the destruction of a mosque in 
India by Hindu fundamentalists which triggers similar retaliation in Bangladesh, 
Pakistan and India, or the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi sparking anti-Sikh riots 
in India.  Because of the presence of ethnic heterogeneity in the SAARC countries, 
there is a fair amount of acrimony, bitterness, animosity and mistrust among the 
different ethnic groups, often giving rise to sub-nationalism or parallel nationalism 
within a given country.  Sikhs demanding Khalistan, Chakma's of Bangladesh 
demanding a separate homeland, Tamils claiming northern Sri Lanka as their 
homeland are some of the examples of sub-nationalism or parallel nationalism 
prevailing in the region.  These conflicts within states are protracted, with immense 
material and human costs to the nationals involved.  These conflicts also trigger 
involuntary migration, which creates refugee problems in neighbouring states as 
millions flee their countries to avoid reprisal, repression and death.  These conscious 





 Table 1 provides us with a summary of leading macroeconomic indicators for 
the SAARC countries.  Based on these cardinal numbers, Chowdhury (1998) 
calculated ordinal ranking of the relative performance of the SAARC countries based 
on the basis of 3 types of characteristics, viz., economic, social and lastly socio-
economic indicators3. The ranking based on Borda score is reported in Table 2. 
 
 












COUNTRY 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 
 
 
Bangladesh 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 
India 2 2 5 3 2 1 2 1 1 
Nepal 4 5 1 5 4 5 5 5 5 
Pakistan 3 1 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 
Sri Lanka 1 4 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 
Source: Chowdhury (1998) Table 4 
Poverty and Income Inequality 
 South Asia as a region is poverty ridden with almost fifty per cent of the 
people living under the poverty line.  Massive anti-poverty programmes are in place 
in all SAARC countries to prevent the proliferation of poverty and optimistic 
projections are that there will be poverty reduction after trickle down effect of 
                                                        
3 The economic indicators chosen were:  (i) average annual growth rate of GDP; (ii)  real GDP per 
capita;  (iii) private consumption share in real GDP;  (iv) investment share of real GDP;  (v) 
government consumption as a percentage of GDP;  (vi)  degree of openness (X + M/GDP);  (vii) 
inflation rate;  (viii)  budgetary position as a ratio of GNP;  (ix) current account balance as a ratio of 
GDP.  The social indicators chosen were:  (i) percentage of urban population;  (ii) life expectancy at 
birth;  (iii) index of per capita food production;  (iv) primary school enrolment ratio;  (v) secondary 
school enrolment ratio;  (vi) share of bottom 40% of households; and (vii) access to safe water. 
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Table 3  Poverty Indicators in SAARC Countries 
 
BANGLADESH 1990 Most recent 
 
Population, mid-year, Million 108.9  128.1 (1999) 
Annual Growth Rate, 1990 - 1999 (%)   1.8  
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)     
    Female 55  59 (1998) 
    Male 55  59 (1998) 
     
Per Capita GNP (US$) 340 (1996) 370 (1999) 
     
Poverty Incidence (National Poverty Line) 47.8 (1988-89) 47.5 (1995-96) 
    Rural 47.8  47.1  
    Urban 47.6  49.7  
Income Ratio: Highest 20% / Lowest 20% 7.0 (1988-89) 8.8 (1995-96) 
Gini Coefficient 0.38 (1988-89) 0.43 (1995-96) 
     
 
BHUTAN 1990 Most recent 
 
Population, mid-year, Million 0.6 (1994) 0.7 (1999) 
Annual Growth Rate, 1994 - 1999 (%)   3.1  
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)     
    Female 59 (1992) 63 (1998) 
    Male 57 (1992) 60 (1998) 
     
Per Capita GNP (US$) 410 (1996) 510 (1999) 
     
Poverty Incidence (National Poverty Line) …  …  
    Rural …  …  
    Urban …  …  
Income Ratio: Highest 20% / Lowest 20% …  …  
Gini Coefficient …  …  
 
 
INDIA 1990 Most recent 
 
Population, mid-year, Million 835.1  986.6 (1999) 
Annual Growth Rate, 1990 - 1999 (%)   1.9  
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)     
    Female 60  63 (1998) 
    Male 59  63 (1998) 
     
Per Capita GNP (US$) 350 (1996) 450 (1999) 
     
Poverty Incidence (National Poverty Line) 38.9 (1987-88) 36.0 (1993-94) 
    Rural 39.1  37.3  
    Urban 38.2  32.4  
Income Ratio: Highest 20% / Lowest 20% …  5.7 (1997) 
Gini Coefficient …  0.38 (1997) 
     
    continued… 




MALDIVES 1990 Most recent 
Population, mid-year, Million 0.2  0.3 (1999) 
Annual Growth Rate, 1990 - 1999 (%)   3.0  
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)     
    Female 61  64 (1998) 
    Male 62  66 (1998) 
Per Capita GNP (US$) 1110 (1996) 1160 (1999) 
Poverty Incidence (National Poverty Line) …  40.0 (1994) 
    Rural …  …  
    Urban …  …  
Income Ratio: Highest 20% / Lowest 20% …  …  







Population, mid-year, Million 18.1  22.4 (1999) 
Annual Growth Rate, 1990 - 1999 (%)   2.4  
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)     
    Female 53  58 (1998) 
    Male 54  58 (1998) 
Per Capita GNP (US$) 210 (1996) 220 (1999) 
Poverty Incidence (National Poverty Line) …  42 (1996) 
    Rural …  44  
    Urban …  23  
Income Ratio: Highest 20% / Lowest 20% …  5.9 (1996) 







Population, mid-year, Million 108.0  134.5 (1999) 
Annual Growth Rate, 1990 - 1999 (%)   2.5  
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)     
    Female 60  66 (1998) 
    Male 58  63 (1998) 
Per Capita GNP (US$) 510 (1996) 470 (1999) 
Poverty Incidence (National Poverty Line) 17.3 (1987-88) 32.6 (1998-99) 
    Rural 18.3  34.8  
    Urban 15.0  25.9  
Income Ratio: Highest 20% / Lowest 20% 8.6  7.1 (1996-97) 
Gini Coefficient 0.4  0.4 (1996-97) 
 
SRI LANKA 1990 Most recent 
Population, mid-year, Million 17  19 (1999) 
Annual Growth Rate, 1990 - 1999 (%)   1.3  
Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)     
    Female 74  76 (1998) 
    Male 69  71 (1998) 
Per Capita GNP (US$) 750 (1996) 820 (1999) 
Poverty Incidence (National Poverty Line) 30.4 (1990-91) 26.7 (1995-96) 
    Rural 34.7  28.7  
    Urban 18.2  13.4  
Income Ratio: Highest 20% / Lowest 20% 9.9 (1990-91) 11.4 (1995-96) 
Gini Coefficient 0.47 (1990-91) 0.48 (1995-96) 
 





economic growth has taken place.  However, income inequality is low within the 
region but shows an upward trend. 
 
III  The Convergence Hypotheses and Empirical Tests 
The concept of convergence can be defined in several ways. According to Sala-i-
Martin (1996:1020) "there is β-convergence if poor economies tend to grow faster 
than rich ones, and a group of economies are converging in the sense of σ if 
dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels tends to decrease over time." Romer 
(1996:27) succinctly cites three important reasons for the convergence process. First, 
the neo-classical growth models predict countries converge to their balanced growth 
paths. Thus to the extent that differences in output per worker arise from countries 
being at different points relative to their balanced growth paths, one would expect the 
poorer countries to catch up to the richer. Second, the Solow model implies that the 
return on capital is lower in countries with more capital per worker. Thus, capital flow 
from rich to poor countries will eventuate leading to convergence.  Lastly, if there are 
lags in the diffusion of knowledge, income differences can arise since some countries 
are yet to employ the appropriate technique of production. These differences can 
disappear once poorer countries gain access to the cutting edge technology. 
 Let yit be the natural logarithm of per capita GDP for economy i (i = 1, 2, …N) 
during period t and σt be the standard deviation of yit across i at time t. Absolute (σ) 
convergence can be tested by estimating the following model: 
σt = α + βt + νt     (1) 
where, α and β are parameters and νt is the stochastic error term. A significant 
negative value for β implies absolute convergence, while β≥0 implies non-
convergence. 
 β-convergence can be tested by running the following regression of growth of 
per capita GDP across economies: 
  (yit - yi,t-T) = α + βyi,t-T + νt   (2) 
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where t indicates the end of the time interval and (t-T) is the beginning (initial) of the 
time interval and νt is the stochastic error term.  In terms of equation (2) a significant 
negative value for β implies beta (β) convergence, while β≥0 implies non-
convergence. 
 The concept of conditional beta convergence (βc) can be derived by 
augmenting equation (2) by including a set of control variables xi (e.g., investment, 
saving, population, openness etc) that are expected to determine the steady-state 
growth of per capita output. Thus, conditional beta convergence (βc) can be tested by 
estimating the following model: 
  (yit - yi,t-T) = α + βyi,t-T + γxi + νt   (3) 
In terms of equation (3) a significant negative β implies convergence holds 
conditionally when γ ≠ 0. 
 
IV  Results and Discussion 
Data for annual per capita GDP for 7 SAARC countries from 1960 to 2000 are 
extracted from the World Bank's World Tables. The result of sigma convergence as 
given by equation (1) is reported in Table 4. OLS estimate revealed high R2 and 
significant β coefficient. However, the model suffered from positive auto-correlation. 
Hence, Cochrane-Orcutt procedure was applied to correct for serial correlation. The 
result from this procedure yielded a higher R2 than OLS but the sign of the β 
coefficient remained positive and highly significant. Thus we are able to reject 








Table 4   Regression Result of Sigma (σ) Convergence Hypothesis 









-10.872      
-22.12 
-10.126      
 -8.507 
R2-Adjusted 0.9267 0.9769 
Durbin’s d 0.3396 1.5829 
B-P-G (DF=1) 5.462      0.724      
RESET (2) Test (DF1=1 & 
DF2=38) 
11.681      -22.340 
 
Beta Convergence 
The estimation result of equation (2) is given in Table 5. Five initial time periods have 
been selected namely 1960, 1970, 1980, 1984 and 1990 and regressions have been run 
compared to these initial time periods. The regressions for any particular period are 
given under the column heading "Time Period" in Table 5. A careful look at Table 5 
reveals that the estimated beta value has never been found to be negative and 
significant. Secondly, the beta value has been found to be positive and insignificant 
throughout except for the period 1984-2000 where the beta value was positive and 
significant.  The weight of evidence does not support beta convergence in SAARC 
countries. To the contrary one can find statistical support for output divergence during 
1984-2000. It may be mentioned that prior to 1984, data on per capita GDP for all 7 
SAARC countries were not available (e.g., Bhutan and Maldives). 
 
 11
Table 5   Result of Beta Convergence 
        
Period β t-value R
2 Period β t-value R
2 
        
1960-70 0.13 0.44 0.06 1970-74 0.05 0.35 0.04 
1960-74 0.16 0.45 0.06 1970-79 0.17 0.92 0.22 
1960-79 0.32 0.75 0.16 1970-84 0.32 1.62 0.47 
1960-84 0.44 0.86 0.20 1970-89 0.27 0.95 0.23 
1960-89 0.31 0.51 0.08 1970-94 0.31 1.06 0.27 
1960-94 0.41 0.68 0.14 1970-99 0.35 1.10 0.29 
1960-99 0.55 1.00 0.25 1970-00 0.35 1.13 0.30 
1960-00 0.56 1.06 0.27     
        
Period β t-value R
2 Period β t-value R
2 
        
1980-84 0.03 0.52 0.06 1984-89 0.09 1.23 0.23 
1980-89 0.00 -0.04 0.00 1984-94 0.16 1.92 0.43 
1980-94 0.03 0.26 0.02 1984-99 0.26 2.00 0.44 
1980-99 0.05 0.28 0.02 1984-00 0.26 1.98 0.44 
1980-00 0.05 0.28 0.02     
        
Period β t-value R
2     
        
1990-94 0.00 0.06 0.00     
1990-99 0.10 1.79 0.39     
1990-00 0.10 1.62 0.34     
        
 
Conditional Beta Convergence 
Conditional Beta (βc) convergence is given by equation (3). The estimation result of 
equation (3) is summarised in Table 6 below. The control variables included in this 
exercise are the rates of growth of population (γ1) and gross domestic savings as a 
proportion of GDP (γ2).  The results show that during the sample period conditional 
beta convergence has failed to take place in the sampled countries. This is true for all 
initial reference periods 1960, 1970, 1980, 1984 and 1990. Interestingly, we can find 
only 2 cases of beta coefficient being significant along with the control variables. 
During 1980-82 we can see beta convergence, while during 1990-94 we can observe 
beta divergence. Hence, the weight of evidence seems to indicate that beta 
convergence failed to take place during the sample period 1960-20004.  
                                                        
4 In this exercise we also sequentially deleted the control variables to see the presence or absence of 
convergence but the results did not differ substantially from the one that is reported in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Result of Conditional Beta Convergence of Per Capita GDP  
 
Period Beta γ1 γ2 R
2 Period Beta γ1 γ2 R
2 
          
1960-70 0.04 25.70 0.01 0.72 1970-74 0.02 -7.37 0.03 0.50 
t-value -0.10 1.41 0.20  t-value 0.07 -0.52 0.68  
1960-74 0.00 17.77 0.03 0.34 1970-79 0.16 -13.48 0.03 0.61 
t-value 0.00 0.51 0.25  t-value 0.54 -0.69 0.57  
1960-79 0.15 15.55 0.03 0.32 1970-84 0.22 -5.87 0.05 0.74 
t-value 0.15 0.36 0.21  t-value 0.70 -0.28 0.92  
1960-84 0.15 22.96 0.06 0.45 1970-89 0.00 3.70 0.09 0.75 
t-value 0.13 0.48 0.34  t-value 0.01 0.15 1.45  
1960-89 -0.20 23.75 0.10 0.45 1970-94 0.10 -5.87 0.09 0.78 
t-value -0.17 0.45 0.54  t-value 0.27 -0.24 1.40  
1960-94 -0.10 6.83 0.10 0.42 1970-99 0.15 -15.73 0.11 0.98 
t-value -0.08 0.31 0.52  t-value 1.11 -1.79 4.57  
1960-99 -0.12 5.44 0.13 0.60 1970-00 0.18 -18.07 0.10 0.98 
t-value -0.12 0.12 0.86  t-value 1.35 -2.07 4.32  
1960-00 -0.07 4.44 0.13 0.59      
t-value -0.07 0.10 0.82       
          
          
          
          
          
Period Beta γ1 γ2 R
2 Period Beta γ1 γ2 R
2 
          
1980-84 0.02 -2.88 -0.01 0.20 1984-89 0.06 14.39 0.05 0.74 
t-value 0.36 -0.42 -0.54  t-value 0.74 1.50 2.34  
1980-89 -0.01 0.51 0.02 0.04 1984-94 0.05 4.27 0.04 0.76 
t-value -0.04 0.03 0.29  t-value 0.74 0.50 2.10  
1980-94 0.02 -7.06 0.01 0.17 1984-99 0.03 -8.28 0.03 0.58 
t-value 0.11 -0.40 0.27  t-value 0.16 -0.45 0.81  
1980-99 0.02 -16.65 0.02 0.32 1984-00 0.01 -11.50 0.02 0.59 
t-value 0.10 -0.76 0.26  t-value 0.06 -0.63 0.65  
1980-00 0.02 -18.97 0.01 0.36      
t-value 0.08 -0.89 0.16       
          
Period Beta γ1 γ2 R
2      
          
1990-94 0.01 -3.03 0.00 0.42      
t-value 0.18 -0.96 -0.04       
1990-99 -0.06 -14.15 0.08 0.90      
t-value -1.14 -3.47 3.46       
1990-00 -0.07 -14.63 0.08 0.83      
t-value -0.92 -2.71 2.60       




Causes of Non-Convergence of GDP in SAARC Countries 
Convergence of per capita GDP remains a polemical issue in growth economics and 
there is no unambiguous view on the factors that lead to convergence of output across 
countries. It is postulated that convergence of per capita output results from a 
combination of economic and non-economic factors. Analytically, there are two broad 
methodological views that can explain the convergence process across economies. 
The first being the technological "catching up" hypothesis where technical know-how 
spreads from the technologically advanced countries to the technologically backward 
countries causing convergence in per capita output levels. Openness in trade, by 
removing tariff and non-tariff barriers, is thought to be the driving force in 
accelerating the adoption and diffusion of appropriate technology across countries. 
This view is quite dominant in the writings of the classical economists like Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo, David Hume and even Alfred Marshal. In the modern era this 
view has also been subscribed by many (Abramovitz, 1986, 1990; Baumol, 1986; 
Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989; Maddison, 1987, 1991) and the list is not exhaustive.  
 The second view is derived from the transitional dynamics of the neoclassical 
growth models. Neoclassical growth models predict that if countries have different 
capital-labour ratios, their growth paths will eventually converge to a steady-state 
growth path because of diminishing returns to capital. Even in an extended Solow 
model, Mankiw et al. (1992) are able to show convergence although at a much more 
slower rate. However, the usual caveat remains, i.e., convergence depends on the 
simplifying assumptions that markets are perfectly competitive, technical change is 
exogenous and the level of technology is the same through out.  Thus, any failure of 
convergence can be attributed to the breakdown of these assumptions. 
 We thus try to explain the various causes with a view to identifying the failure 





Intra-regional Trade Structure in South Asia 
 Intra-country trade in goods, services and finance among SAARC countries is 
small compared to the overall trade of the region.  If SAARC is to generate mutually 
beneficial economic gains, trade linkages must be established and strengthened 
among the member countries. Tables 7 and 8 show the trends in intra-country trade 
among SAARC countries. 
Tables 7 and 8 show that intra-country trade is very low and these figures are 
steadily declining over time.  With the exception of Nepal-India trade, no other  
 15
Table 7 Intra-Country Exports in the SAARC Region 
  (Figures are percentage of total exports) 
 
 




  1981 --- na 2.5 0 0 5.3 0.3 
  1987 --- na 1.0 0 0.5 2.6 0 
  1991 --- na 1.4 0 0.7 2.3 0.4 
  1995 --- na 1.2 na 0.3 0.8 0.4 
  1999 --- 0.02 1.1 na 0.1 0.6 0.2 
 
 BHUTAN 
  1981 na na na na na na na 
  1987 na na na na na na na 
  1991 na na na na na na na 
  1995 na na na na na na na 
  1999 na na na na na na na 
 
 INDIA 
  1981 0.7 na --- na 1.2 0 1.0 
  1987 1.3 na --- 0 0.6 0.1 0.6 
  1991 0.9 na --- 3.3 0.3 0.2 0.7 
  1995 3.1 0.04 --- 0.04 0.4 0.2 1.3 
  1999 2.4 0.05 --- 0.02 0.9 0.3 1.4 
 
 MALDIVES 
  1981 na na na --- na na na 
  1987 0 na 0 --- na 0.1 16.4 
  1991 0 na 0 --- na 0 19.2 
  1995 na na na --- na na na 
  1999 na na na --- na na na 
 
 NEPAL 
  1981 11 na 43 na --- 2 0 
  1987 0 na 24.7 na --- 0.6 1.3 
  1991 0 na 6.1 na --- 1.5 0 
  1995 1.2 na 7.7 na --- na 0.3 
  1999 1.4 na 27.7 na --- 0.2 7.2 
 
 PAKISTAN  
  1981 2.0 na 2.3 na 0 --- 1.0 
  1987 2.2 na 0.5 0 0 --- 1.2 
  1991 1.5 na 0.7 0 0 --- 1.0 
  1995 1.9 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.04 --- 0.7 
  1999 1.3 na 1.0 0.01 0.02 --- 1.2 
 
 SRI LANKA 
  1981 0.2 na 2.8 na 0 5.1 --- 
  1987 0.7 na 0.5 0.5 0 2.3 --- 
  1991 0.2 na 1.0 0.4 0 1.5 --- 
  1995 0.3 na 0.8 0.4 na 1.1 --- 
  1999 0.2 na 1.1 0.7 0.05 0.8 --- 
 
Source:  IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks, IMF, 1988, 1992, 2002. 
'na' denotes - not available 
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Table 8 Intra-Country Imports in the SAARC Region 
  (Figures are percentage of total imports) 
 
 




  1981 --- na 2.4 na 0 5.3 0.3 
  1987 --- na 2.8 0 0 1.4 0.2 
  1991 --- na 5.6 0 0 1.7 0.1 
  1995 --- 0.06 15.3 na 0.06 2.1 0.2 
  1999 --- 0.05 12.3 0.01 0.11 1.0 0.1 
 
 BHUTAN 
  1981 na na na na na na na 
  1987 na na na na na na na 
  1991 na na na na na na na 
  1995 na na na na na na na 
  1999 na na na na na na na 
 
 INDIA 
  1981 0.1 na --- na 0.3 0.5 0.4 
  1987 0 na --- 0 0.2 0.1 0 
  1991 0.1 na --- 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 
  1995 0.2 na --- na 0.08 0.1 0.1 
  1999 0.1 na --- na 0.35 0.2 0.1 
 
 MALDIVES 
  1981 na na na --- na na na 
  1987 0 na 3.1 --- na 0.4 8.7 
  1991 0 na 7.4 --- na 0.4 7.3 
  1995 na na na --- na na na 
  1999 na na na --- na na na 
 
 NEPAL 
  1981 0.1 na 41 na --- 0 0 
  1987 1.0 na 14.1 na --- 0.3 0 
  1991 1.7 na 6.5 na --- 0 0 
  1995 1.5 na 15.7 na --- 0.4 na 
  1999 0.4 na 31.0 na --- 0.1 0.1 
 
 PAKISTAN  
  1981 1.0 na 0.1 na 0.1 --- 2.2 
  1987 0.9 na 0.2 0 0 --- 0.9 
  1991 0.4 na 0.5 0 0 --- 0.8 
  1995 0.3 na 0.7 na 0.01 --- 0.4 
  1999 0.3 na 1.3 na 0.01 --- 0.4 
 
 SRI LANKA 
  1981 .1 na 4.1 na 0 0.1 --- 
  1987 0 na 4.1 0.3 0.1 2.3 --- 
  1991 0.2 na 4.5 0.4 0 2.4 --- 
  1995 0.02 na 9.8 0.02 0.02 1.1 --- 
  1999 0.4 na 10.1 0.1 0.1 1.7 --- 
 
Source:  IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks, IMF, 1988, 1992, 2002. 
'na' denotes - not available 
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countries in SAARC have a significant amount of trade with one another.  The Nepal-
India trade is also waning due to frictions between the two countries over trade and 
other issues. 
 This low volume of trade flows between SAARC countries is caused by 
several factors.  First, SAARC countries have similar patterns of resource 
endowments which favours labour intensive production modes.  Hence, gains from 
specialisation and exchange cannot be meaningfully exploited by these countries with 
similar factor intensities as postulated by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade 
theory.   
There are certain non-economic factors that also create impediments to the 
growth of intra-country trade.  Amongst them, the perennial hostility between India 
and Pakistan and Bangladesh has stifled the growth of trade links amongst these 
countries.  Further, all the SAARC countries are dependent on external assistance and 
aid in order to overcome their current account deficits.  External assistance and aid 
comes with conditionality clauses attached to the packages.  The tying of aid alone 
stifles the creation of intra-regional trade among the SAARC countries. 
It is contended that economic growth is spurred by accumulation of physical 
and human capital and through advances in technology (total factor productivity).  
Many factors can promote or hinder these processes. Experience shows that countries 
that have grown rapidly have been successful in creating conditions that are 
conducive to long-run per capita income growth. These include: 
1. Maintenance of macroeconomic stability to foster saving and investment; 
2. Liberalised trade regimes to promote efficiency in trade and investment; 
3. Structural reforms to encourage domestic competition; 
4. Building of strong institutions and political stability to foster good governance; 
5. Emphasis on education, training, and R&D to promote productivity; and 
6. Prudent external debt management to ensure adequate resources for sustainable 
development. 
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 Sadly, on all of these counts South Asia has fared very poorly. Economic 
management was poor that are provided by a mediocre civil service who are under 
political pressures.  All South Asian countries have a history of longstanding 
economic restrictions resulting in inefficiencies and appropriation of government 
granted monopoly rents. It is only in the early 1990s that South Asian began to 
liberalise with India taking the lead in response to an international balance of 
payments crisis. These reforms are by no means a return to laissez-faire policies and 
more work needs to be done in South Asian countries for achieving an outward-
oriented industrial and trade regime.   
 Most importantly, besides market failure there has been a massive and colossal  
government failure in South Asia. Whether a nation succeeds or fails in its efforts to 
promote development is closely related to the character and quality of its governance5.  
Good governance promotes, supports and sustains human development, based on 
expanding human capabilities, choices, opportunities and freedoms (economic, social 
as well as political), specially for the poorest and the most marginalised members of 
society.  
Hayami (1997) demonstrates, with cross-country comparisons and historical 
data, that country-specific factors such as governance, institutions and culture play a 
dominant role in determining the growth path of a country. Countries with similar 
resource endowments can experience sharply divergent growth pattern simply 
because of country-specific governance and organisations. Some examples of this 
phenomenon are India and Pakistan, North Korea and South Korea and Kenya and 
Tanzania. 
South Asia as a region has been plagued by low income growth and relatively 
                                                        
5 According to the UNDP the characteristics of good governance are: (1) Participation (2) Rule of Law 
(3) Transparency (4) Responsiveness (5) Equity (6) Accountability and (7) Strategic Vision. 
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high population growth leading to “low equilibrium” trap. Lack of proper institutions, 
organisations and mass participation in the region can severely constrain the 
utilisation of efficient production techniques and further exacerbate the “low 
equilibrium” trap. 
It is common knowledge that corruption is severely undermining development 
objectives in South Asian countries by hindering economic growth, reducing 
efficiency, acting as a disincentive to potential investors and, above all, by diverting 
critical resources meant for poverty alleviation.  
 Transparency International has designed a database on corruption in public 
services in five countries in South Asia6.  According to Transparency International 
(2002) "The never-ending saga of high-profile exposés and racy media coverage of 
graft in recent years offer a disquieting reel of vignettes on the magnitude of 
corruption in all spheres of life."  The level of corruption is given by the annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency International since 
1995 and is reported below. 
Table 9   Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Scores 
 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Bangladesh N/A 2.29 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.4 1.2 
India 2.78 2.63 2.75 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 
Pakistan 2.25 1.00 2.53 2.7 2.22 N/A 2.3 2.6 
Sri Lanka N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.7 
Source: Transparency International (2002) Table 1. 
Note: Scores relate to the perception of corruption among business people (both 
resident local and expatriate), academics and risk analysts, and range between 10 
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
 
 Transparency International (2002:4) also demonstrate a high degree of 
correlation between the corruption index of a country and its human development 
index (HDI) score, i.e., the lower the CPI the lower is the HDI of the country. Further, 
                                                        
6 It is the first regional survey of its kind in South Asia, measuring the extent, spread and intensity of 
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Transparency International (2002:5) quotes some studies on the cost of corruption in 
South Asia and reports, 
"To quote some studies on the South Asian experience: If India were to 
reduce corruption to the level that exists in the Scandinavian countries, 
investment could be increased by 12 percent and the GDP growth rate by 1.5 
percent per annum. Similarly, Bangladesh could increase its GDP growth rate 
by half a percent if profiteering practices were reduced to the level found in 
Uruguay. And, if Pakistan were to reduce its level of corruption to be on a par 
with Singapore, GDP growth rates could increase by two percentage points." 
  
Another reason for non-convergence of per capita output in South Asia can be 
explained in terms of the endogenous growth theories (EGTs) where growth is an 
endogenous function of policy incentives and private behaviour. EGTs postulate that 
individuals can accumulate all factors of production. Investment in human capital 
augments labour. Thus, physical capital and labour-augmenting capital will grow 
together in the long-run, preventing diminishing returns to physical capital. 
 Lastly, Easterly (1998) refers to the vicious circle of a  "poverty trap".  
Easterly (1998:9) writes "…countries in poverty traps will not attract physical or 
human capital from abroad. The low average human and physical capital lowers the 
return to new capital. …. Rich countries make their physical capital movements at 
home or in other rich countries, not in poor countries."  This point is true for South 
Asian countries as shown in Table 10. 
                                                                                                                                                              
corruption in seven key sectors from a user’s perspective. 
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Table 10   Private Capital Flow and Foreign Direct Investment in South Asia 
Country Gross Private Capital 
Flows (% of GDP) 
1990                         2000 
Gross Foreign Direct 
Investment (% of GDP) 
1990                         2000 
Bangladesh 0.9                             3.6 0.0                             0.6 
India 0.8                             3.0 0.0                             0.6 
Nepal 3.5                             4.8 0.0                             0.0 
Pakistan 4.2                             2.5 0.6                             0.5 
Sri Lanka 13.1                           7.6 0.5                             1.1 
Source: World Bank (2002) World Development Indicators Table 6.1 
Then, Easterly (1998:9) gives the example of movement of human capital by 
citing the Brain Drain phenomenon: "Skilled surgeons or investment bankers or 
lawyers flow to countries and cities where there is already a concentration of skilled 
surgeons or investment bankers or lawyers. Again, this is evidence that there is a 
productivity spillover from high average skills to the new entrant" Easterly (1998:9).  
In conclusion Easterly (1998:9) writes, "Countries that start poor tend to stay poor, 
because the incentives are poor. People respond to incentives. People respond to 
incentives. People respond to incentives." 
 
V   Summary and Conclusion 
In this study three concepts of convergence have been identified namely σ 
convergence, β convergence and conditional β convergence (βc).  These were tested 
for seven South Asian countries representing SAARC by using World Bank data from 
1960-2000. Our empirical results show the absence of per capita income convergence 
in South Asia. A clear finding of this study is the rising per capita income dispersion 
in the region as indicated by σ convergence. We next explored the reasons for income 
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divergence in South Asia. We concentrated our attention on both economic and non-
economic factors in trying to explain the non-convergence. Trade links, which is 
supposed to be a conduit for transmission of technology and resources, among South 
Asian countries are very weak. Further more, factors conducive to long-run economic 
growth were absent in the South Asian economies. This was further compounded by 
weak governance as these countries have scored very poorly on the governance 
indicators7.  South Asian countries have so far failed to break the poor governance 
cycle and Transparency International Report (2002:5) provides an answer. "A major 
reason seems to be the weak demand for mobilisation around critical governance 
themes. Most governance initiatives appear to be externally driven or top-down, with 
little or no ownership inside the country, specifically among the critical stakeholders – 
the citizens. This explains to a large extent why there are very few civil society 
initiatives that link up to the ongoing macro reforms." 
Unless strong national economic policies are put in place growth in South Asia 
is likely to worsen in the future. Easterly (1998:10) catalogues "a list of policies that 
each by itself goes with an increase of one percentage point in growth".  These policy 
measures are derived from empirical results and are listed below: 
• Increase of 1.2 years in average schooling of labour force. 
• An increase in secondary enrolment of 40 percentage points 
• A reduction of 28 percentage points in the share of central bank credit in 
total credit 
• An increase of 50 percentage points in financial depth (M2/GDP) 
• An increase of 1.7 per cent of GDP in public investment in transport and 
                                                        
7 These indicators are Polity Score, Press Freedom, Voice & Accountability, Law & Order, Government 




• A fall in inflation of 26 percentage points 
• A reduction in the government deficit of 4.3 percentage points of GDP 
• A fall in the black market premium on the exchange rate of 36 percentage 
points 
• An increase in (exports + imports)/GDP of 40 percentage points 
• A fall in government consumption/GDP of 8 percentage points 
• An increase in foreign direct investment/GDP of 1.25 percentage points. 
South Asian countries need to embrace these policy measures either as a package or to 
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